Recent posts of this series have focused on Chapter 5 of From D to D, titled, "Exercising Power." This chapter describes some of the characteristics and features of nonviolent power when it is deployed by a group engaged in a liberation struggle. One point which is mentioned in the chapter is that a nonviolent struggle works through various methods of struggle. As Sharp says, "The use of a considerable number of these methods - carefully chosen, applied persistently and on a large scale, wielded in the context of a wise strategy and appropriate tactics, by trained civilians - is likely to cause any illegitimate regime severe problems. This applies to all dictatorships." This also applies to all other types of agents of oppression as well, including corporations and other holders of concentrated wealth and entrenched privilege.
A list of 198 identified methods of nonviolent struggle is provided in an appendix to From D to D. Part 2 of Gene Sharp's three part work The Politics of Nonviolent Action elaborates on each of these methods and describes cases both of success and of failure in the uses of the various methods. In the spirit of full disclosure, I have to admit that I am still studying these cases, so I cannot provide a definitive analysis of the entire package of methods as described by Sharp. However, I can draw a few lessons from the cases I have read.
The first observation is that those methods which are reactionary - that is, methods which arise spontaneously as a reaction to a sudden threat - often fail to immediately achieve any lasting change. This applies especially to the methods which are categorized under "Protest and Persuasion." Cases of such failures include the failures of spontaneous protest or of spontaneous organization of parallel institutions in Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the 1968 invasion by Russian troops. Although the emergence of these protests and institutions temporarily (and significantly!) slowed the Soviet Russian consolidation of control, they ultimately collapsed. However, these actions created a residue of "cause-consciousness" among people that could then be amplified by subsequent actions. Those actions which are undertaken merely to register dissatisfaction or to blow off steam often fail to achieve anything. A case in point is that of a farmer who lived near the Miramar Naval Air Station in the 1960's. He was so angered by the constant jet noise from the base that he used a tractor to plow the word QUIET in large letters in his field. The base did not become quieter, however.
Those methods which are deployed under the guidance of a wise grand strategy of resistance or liberation (or which emerge as part of a larger struggle with a larger strategic goal) tend to be more successful. Those people who are part of a liberation struggle that wants to accomplish more than just blowing off steam must therefore examine each method they choose to assess its total contribution to the liberation struggle and its total effect - both immediate and long-term - on the oppressor group. It must be remembered that the existence of an oppressed group and of an oppressor group is due to a fundamental imbalance of power that exists between oppressor and oppressed. A fundamental goal of a liberation struggle is therefore either to deliver the oppressed out of the power of the oppressor or to correct the imbalance of power so that the oppressor can no longer oppress. Some questions to ask regarding methods are as follows:
- Does the method under consideration strengthen the oppressed group - either by communicating and spreading cause-consciousness, or by creating more cohesive bonds between members of the struggle group, or by meeting actual material or social needs of the struggle group?
- Does the method under consideration apply effective pressure to the oppressor? Note that in democratic or semi-democratic societies, large protest marches and rallies may not pose the same degree of threat or challenge to existing authority as such rallies would pose in a more totalitarian society. However, such rallies (and other acts of protest and persuasion such as sending symbolic objects to authorities) may sometimes indeed be perceived as a credible threat to established power even in "democratic" societies, as was seen in the heavy-handed police response to Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests which took place in the U.S. and elsewhere in 2020. Note also that the protests now occurring in Russia against the arrest of Alexei Navalny are an example of the susceptibility of brittle authoritarian regimes to disruption by mass protest. See this and this also. It seems that Putin may be losing his grip! Note, however, that a key to the success of the Russian protest movement will lie in whether or not the protestors are willing to maintain nonviolent discipline. Violence by the protestors against police will only strengthen Putin's pillars of support and make it harder for the movement to achieve its goals.
- Does the oppressor possess methods or techniques which can neutralize the chosen methods of the nonviolent struggle group?
- Remember that a major source of the strength of the nonviolent actionists is the contrast which they are able to present between themselves and their frequently violent oppressors. If these oppressors can inject an element of violence into a nonviolent method used by the nonviolent struggle group, the oppressors can damage the credibility of the nonviolent group. This happened with the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020. Although 93 percent of the protests were completely nonviolent, white agents provocateurs were able to inject violence into the remaining protests, which drew disproportionate media coverage and enabled police to justify extremely heavy-handed action against protestors. (See this and this, for instance.) This violence also led over time to a decrease in support for the BLM protests. Had the BLM protests shifted to methods and venues that precluded the injection of violence, things might have been different. On the other hand, the protests for Navalny and against Putin are taking place in a context in which Putin's repertoire of countermeasures is becoming increasingly powerless. Therefore the protests are having a significant impact.
- In addition to injecting violence into a method of nonviolent action, what else can an oppressor do to render the action ineffective? Three cases come to mind. Two of these cases were mentioned by Sharp in Part 2 of The Politics of Nonviolent Action. In one case, during the Sino-Soviet conflict of the late 1960's, a platoon of Chines soldiers began to march to the Russian border every day in order to make a rude gesture toward the Russians. This gesture involved, shall we say, "partial disrobing." However, the Russians eventually stopped these gestures when one morning they set up large pictures of Chairman Mao facing the Chinese side of the border. From that day on, the Chinese soldiers kept their clothes on. In another case, when faced with hunger strikes by political prisoners, the British government would release these prisoners when they became weak from fasting, then re-arrest them once their strength had recovered. This became an effective means of breaking hunger strikes. In much more recent times, the government of Indian Hindu ultra-nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi has neutralized the power of hunger strikes by untouchables in India. His solution: simply to let people die; that is, to refuse to care whether they die or not.
- Is the method under consideration the only method which the nonviolent struggle group intends to use, or is it part of a larger suite of diverse methods? As was written by a science fiction writer I read back when I was a kid, "a one trick fighter is easy to whip if you know two, and I know half a hundred." Reliance on only one method of action was the great weakness of the BLM protests last year.
- Does the chosen method contribute to the ultimate strategic goal of the struggle group? If not, it may be a waste of time from a strategic standpoint.
- Lastly, is the chosen method within the ability of the struggle group at a particular point in time and a particular stage of the struggle? For instance, if I send a thousand letters to various radio and TV stations, newspapers, and online media outlets announcing that on April 1, 2021, I will instigate a six-week total boycott of Hostess Twinkies as an act of protest against (write whatever grievance you want in this space: _____________________), I'd better have the organizational capacity to deliver on the threat if I don't want to look like a fool come April 2nd.
As can be seen, the choice of appropriate methods for a nonviolent liberation struggle involves a careful assessment of the potential and drawbacks of each potential method under consideration, as well as a careful understanding of the history of the use of each of these potential methods. The choice of the appropriate methods of struggle is therefore influenced by the development of an appropriate strategy of struggle. The next post in this series will, God willing, therefore begin an exploration of Chapter 6 of From D to D, titled, "The Need For Strategic Planning."
