(Some readers may be wondering why my last two posts (as well as the next two or three) are taking a trip down the path of Russian and Byzantine history, especially the history of the Byzantine (Orthodox) church. You may be asking, "What does that have to do with things happening in the world today?" Hang in there; I'll try to have a satisfying answer for you at the end.)
Last week's post sketched out the role of the Russian Orthodox church in promoting the myth of Russia as the "Third Rome," the heir to the spiritual and political mantle of the Byzantine Empire. To see the deeper significance of the "Rome" in the Byzantine empire, it is helpful to see how Church and State were related to each other in Byzantium, and how State and Church rang some changes in that relationship in Russia after the fall of Byzantium. Let's begin by defining the word "symphony." And here I will rely not only on Wikipedia definitions, but I will be drawing extensively on Russia and the Nordic Countries: State, Religion, and Society, published by Fondet for Dansk-Norsk Samarbeid in 2016.
In the Byzantine empire, symphony referred to the formal arrangement between Church and State, which was explicitly stated by the emperor Justinian in 535 A.D. In this symphony, both Church and State were to be collaborators in the project of the "protection and spread of the Christian Church..." This concept was refined by patriarch (supreme bishop) Photius in the ninth century A.D. He explicitly stated that emperor and Church patriarch were not merely collaborators, but equal partners in a project which was fundamentally religious in nature. Therefore, the State was not supposed to dominate the Church, nor vice versa - in other words, the patriarch was not to be head of state, nor the emperor head of the Church. There is a further significance to the concept of symphony, namely, that under this arrangement, it was not possible "...that the emperor might profess any other religion than Orthodox Christianity...The idea expressed already by Christ Himself that there should be a distinction between what belongs to the emperor and what belongs to God...seems quite difficult to realize in a construction like the Byzantine theocracy." In other words, secularization was utterly incompatible with Byzantine symphony. (Quotes taken from "The History and Theology of Russian Orthodoxy," Gottlieb, Russia and the Nordic Countries: State, Religion, and Society, 2016.)
It is important to note that the establishment of a State church in the original Roman empire did not follow the principle of symphony. According to some sources, when the first State church emerged under the emperor Constantine, he established himself as "Head of the Church," thus establishing himself as a caesaropapist. (Now there's a new word for ya!) It is also important to note that not all Byzantine emperors submitted to the doctrine of symphony; therefore, there were not a few caesaropapists in their number as well. The practice of caesaropapism was a convenient way for a Roman or Byzantine emperor to consolidate and amplify his power, especially when seeking to expand his territory through imperial conquest or to eliminate internal threats to his power.
After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Russia (especially Muscovy Russia) sought to lay claim on the title of "Third Rome" in two ways. First, the Russian clergy established the Russian Orthodox church as autocephalous. In other words, a Russian cleric became the head (the patriarch) of the Russian Church, independent from Orthodox patriarchs in Constantinople or Greece. This project began in 1448 according to Gottlieb, took over a century to complete, and wasn't formally fulfilled until 1589, according to Laats. (Laats, "The Concept of the Third Rome and Its Political Implications," retrieved on 30 July 2017.) And the Russian rulers first adopted the title of "Tsar" (Царь, literally, "Caesar,") in 1547 with the coronation of Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible), thus establishing a Russian head of state as a continuation of the line of the Caesars of the first and second Rome.
How did symphony play out in Russia after 1453? Well, first of all, we must note that it didn't always play out. According to Laats, Tsar Ivan IV used the concept of theocracy to promote himself as defender of the Orthodox faith. "His wars were against 'Muslim unbelievers' and 'the Catholic enemy of Christianity'. The mission of the Russian church was directly grounded in [Ivan's] military victories...The state or the monarch was the real head of the church. Ivan the Terrible 'sees the tsardom as a divine commission and himself as head of the church and representative of God on earth...'"
To be sure, the Russian Orthodox Church pushed back against the power of the tsars, with the Patriarch Nikon seeking in 1652 to establish the "preeminence of the patriarch over the tsar..." (Gottlieb). However, Nikon lost that particular battle, and the attempts by the Russian Orthodox Church to continue the fight resulted in the breaking of Church power by Tsar Peter the Great in the 18th century. Peter made the Church definitely subservient to the State and made it the "official state church of the Russian Empire." This arrangement continued under Catherine the Great, and lasted, with some variations to this form, until the revolutions of 1917.
And as for the role of the concept of the Third Rome in Russian internal and foreign policy, Laats says that "The universality of Rome was connected to pax romana. The goal of Rome was to establish a universal empire, which would supersede the disorderly competition between nations and establish world peace. The monk Filofei, one of the masterminds of the doctrine of the Third Rome wrote that 'all Christian realms will comne to an end and will unite into the one single realm of our sovereign.'" Moscow came also to possess an eschatological cultural dimension - not only as special and closer to God than any other city, but as the center of the last Rome, the fulfillment of all history. The tsar therefore becomes an eschatological ruler, head of both Church and State. And Russia itself became "holy", "elected by God and having a special task in the divine story within the world." This is why the ability of the Russian tsardom to use Russian Orthodoxy as a tool for expansion of secular power is so significant.
According to Laats, this concept of Russia as the Third Rome was officially renounced by the Russian Church in 1667, and has not been explicitly stated by Church or State since then. Yet it has remained the undercurrent and foundation of Russian state policy and identity from that time onward, under Tsar Nicholas I and Tsar Alexander III (and, as some would argue, under Russian communism).
How have Russian Orthodoxy and the concept of the Third Rome influenced Russian leadership and policy since the fall of Soviet communism? What bearing do these have on the regime of Vladimir Putin? I hope to start answering those questions in my next post. Stay tuned...
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